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by Jay Conison* 
Chicago, Illinois 
A uretail price ceiling," as the terrn 
is used here, is a maximum price 
that ( 1) a manufacturer, franchi-
sor or supplier• (2) allows a re-
tailer with whom he is in a 
distributional relationship (3) to 
charge consumers (4) for products 





• •. t ~· ~,, 
._. _,.J"r " 
'"'- v· turer has an interest. Since retail ~~1 
price ceilings keep prices low and 1 · 
• 
thereby benefit consumers, there J 
would seem., at first glance, to be Jay Conison 
nothing wrong or improper with them. Yet, under present 
antitrust law, retail price ceilings are unlawful per se: they 
are always unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act,2 
and the trier of fact will not listen to justifications. 
A well-known trend in recent years has been to construe 
and apply the antitrust laws exclusively by reference to eco-. 
nomic principles. 3 Advocates of an exclusively economic 
approach to the antitrust laws argue, on theoretical grounds 
alone, that retail price ceilings should always be lawful or, 
at least, that the lawfulness of the practice should be subject 
to a rule of reason. 4 To be sure, economic analysis has long 
been viewed as a helpful and legitimate method for con-
struing and applying the antitrust laws. However, primary 
reliance on it has been rejected by Congress5 and has been 
heavily and repeatedly criticized by legal scholars. 6 More-
over, as will be seen below, the prohibition of retail price 
ceilings rests almost entirely on a libertarian, rather than an 
economic, rationale. Thus, even if the present standard of 
per se unlawfulness is unjustified and retail price ceilings 
indeed are sometimes reasonable and desirable, theoretical 
economic arguments are not likely to be the most compel-
ling ones to effect a change in the law. 
There are, however, practical business arguments for soft-
ening the ban on retail price ceilings. What is curious about 
*Mr. Conison is an associate with the law firm of Sonnenschein. Carlin, 
Nash & Rosenthal in Chicago. Illinois. 
• 
the present state of the law is that retail price ceilings are of 
antitrust concern only when they are used in a distributional 
relationship. Where there is no distributional relation-
ship where, for example, the party attempting to place a 
ceiling on a dealer's retail price can be viewed as a con-
sumer, rather than as a manufacturer there is no per se 
violation of section I. 7 Yet, in a distributional relationship, 
the manufacturer inevitably has some interest often a le-
gally recognized and protected one in the product or ser-
vice sold by the dealer and in the manner of its sale. Such 
interest may be by virtue of the manufacturer's role, for 
example, as a trademark licensor or as a party potentially 
subject to liability for defects. Yet that business interest, 
which is a precondition of the manufacturer's vulnerability 
to antitrust liability, may be an interest which, when ex-
amined more closely, justifies some fornt of manufacturer 
involvement in the retailer's pricing. 
The following discussion shows some of the business in-
• 
terests recognized as permitting manufacturer involvement 
in retail pricing, the scope of their present acceptance by 
(continued on page 16) 
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courts, and their potential for further application. First; 
though, one must understand how the prohibition of retail 
price ce iIi ngs developed. 
I. The Rationale and Effect of the 
Present Prohibition 
In its 1940 decision, United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil 
Co .. /' the U.S. Supreme Court explained its finding of the 
illegality of a cartel by stating that ua combination fortned . 
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, 
fixing, pegging~ or stabilizing the price of a commodity in 
interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se"'9 The refer-
ence to udepressingn prices was dictum, but it was the first 
suggestion by the Court that maximum price fixing, at least 
by competitors, might be per se illegal. The suggestion was 
made into a rule ten years later in Kiefer-Stewa.rt Co. v. Jo-
seph E. Seagra1n & Sons, Inc. 10 There the Court, relying solely 
on the unelaborated dictum in Socony, held that agreements 
between competitors to fix maximum prices for the resale 
Price ceilings are illegal mainly b·ecause 
they '' 'cripple the freedom of traders and 
thereby restrain their ability to sell in ac-
cordance with their own judgment.' '' 
. 
• 
of their products are per se illegal. In the Courfs view, ..,such 
agreements .. no less than those to fix minimum prices, crip-
ple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability 
to sell in accordance with their own judgment.H•• 
Kie..fer-Stewart .. since it involved an agreement to fix re-
sale prices, and because its rationale was protection of the 
freedom of traders, suggested a further rule: that a retail 
price ceiling imposed by a single manufacturer, even on a 
single dealer, might be per se iJlegal. 12 In 1968, the Supreme 
Court .. in Albrecht v. Herald Co., u held such a rule to be the 
law. 
Albrecht was a new~paper case. The Herald Company 
granted exclusive territories to independent carriers. To 
prevent abuse of the local monopolies it had created, the 
newspaper advertised suggested retail prices and provided 
in the distributorship agreement that the agreement would 
be terminated if prices exceeded the advertised maximum. 14 
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efforts to bring his prices in line failed, his distributorship 
was tertninated. 
With little ado and less analysis, the Court held that a 
. retail price ceiling automatically violates section l of the 
Sherman Act. Echoing the language of Kiefer-Stew/art, it 
stated that: 
Maximum and minimum price fixing may have different con-
sequences in many situations. But schemes to fix maximum 
prices .. by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller 
for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude 
upon the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that mar-
ket.•~ 
The Court rejected the defense, which had been accepted 
by the court of appeals, that a price ceiling was necessary to 
protect the public from Hprice gougingn by the carriers. 
The important result of Albrecht, beyond its mere holding 
unlawful of retail price ceilings, was to help make protection 
of the pricing independence of retailers the preeminent con-
cern of the Sherman Act. So important was this concern that 
the Court held interference with the pricing activity of a 
single retailer, irrespective of effect on market conditions, 
to violate section 1. 
Albrecht should be contrasted with Dr. Miles Medical Co. 
v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 16 the case holding minimum 
retail price maintenance to be unreasonable. The Court 
there, unlike in Albrecht, reached its conclusion through ex-
amination of market impact. In that case, a vast number of 
retailers were part of the price maintenance system, and, as 
~ consequence, the system had the market effect of a retailer 
cartel. 17 The Court had already held that retailer cartels vi-
olate the Sherntan Act. 18 
Consistent with its concern for market effect, the Miles 
Court, in dictum, suggested that a "single transaction, con-
ceivably unr~lated to the public interest," might be up-
held.19 But the price-fixing combination in Albrecht was not 
marketwide: it arose only between the newspaper and the 
plaintiff and only when the plaintiff had violated the sug-
gested prices and the newspaper then sought to compel ad-
here.nce. As a result, in holding that this combination 
violated the Sherman Act, the Court discarded the usingle 
transaction" exception and held illegal per se isolated re-
straints on the pricing discretion of an individual retailer. 20 
II. Unacceptability of the Albrecht Rule 
to Lower Courts 
The rule of Albrecht is that any coercive or contractual 
restriction by a manufacturer on a dealer's discretion to 
charge as much as he wants violates the Sherrnan Act. 21 The 
Supreme Court, has not had occasion explicitly to reconsider 
the holding, but in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical So-
ciety, 22 it reaffirnted, in strong dictum, that price ceilings 
are illegal, mainly because they "'cripple the freedom of 
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accor-
dance with their own judgment.' ,..23 
Notwithstanding the dictum in Maricopa County, the 
' 
holding in Albrecht is vulnerable to judicial limitation. Its 
weakness is not that it represents bad economic theory. 
Rather, the problem is that the decision is based on an un-
tenable view of the nature of marketing and distribution. 
Lower federal courts have been uncomfortable with Al-
brecht s per se prohibition and have groped for reasons that 
might justify a manufacturer's restricting the discretion of 
In the court's view, in the context of price 
promotions, the manufacturer's interest in 
assuring the truthfulness of the promo-
tions could legitimate substantial control 
of the dealers' prices. 
dealers to charge as much as they want. In this way, courts 
have recognized certain interests of a manufacturer to be so 
compelling as to justify interference in a retailer's pricing. 
One approach to escaping the per se prohibition was taken 
in Consortium. Inc. v. Knoxville International Energy Ex-
position.~4 There, the defendant was the owner of certain 
trademarks. lt licensed one of the plaintiffs to sell products 
not manufactured by ·the defendant but marked with the 
defendant's trademarks. The licensing agreement provided 
that the licensee would. at the outset, obtain the defendant's 
approval of a list of maximum prices for goods so marked 
and would increase those prices only with the written ap-
proval of defendant. The licensee chalJenged the license as 
a contract to fix maximum prices. The court not only dis-
agreed, but it granted summary judgment for the defe.ndant, 
reasoning that the parties did not enter into a resale arrange-
ment, but instead ••merely entered into a joint venture or 
4>partnership' by which the trademark owner shared its 
goodwill with the licensee in exchange for a share of prof-
its. ":!5 A partnership, which by its nature requires parties to 
agree on price, does not violate the Sherman Act. 26 Thus, 
on the court ·s analogical reasoning, the licensor-4 'partner'' 
. ' 
was privileged to participate in the resale pricing of the 
goods. The court thus held the rule of reason to apply to the 
arrangement and then held the arrangement legal. 
The approach of the court in Consortium 01ay easily be· 
generalized. In particular, the reasoning applies to any busi-
ness format franchising relationship one in which the 
franchisor licenses the franchisee to use its trademarks and 
business format.:! 7 Consequently, retail price ceilings, when 
used in this very common form of distribution relationship, 
would virtually be immune from antitrust attack. But it is 
doubtful that courts at present wouid allow the rationale of 
Cvnsortiu1n to be extended so far. 
. . 
• 
A more restrained approach has been taken by the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals. There, the court did not analogize 
the manufacturer-dealer relationship to some other legal or 
economic relationship and did not discover an essentially 
unlimited privilege of the manufacturer to participate in re-
tail pricing. Instead, the court took the manufacturer-dealer 
relationship for what it was and found a limited domain in 
which the manufacturer's control of maximum price was suf-
ficiently justified as not to be barred per se. In Jack Walters 
& Son Corp. v. Morton Building, lnc.,28 a manufacturer of 
prefabricated farrn buildings often would advertise special 
deals, involving reduced prices, directly to consumers. Deal-
ers were given a discount; they were also threatened with 
tern1ination if they went above the advertised price, and they 
were monitored for compliance. The court held the practic.e 
to be perrnissible. In the court;s view, in the context of price 
prom:otions, the manufacturer's interest in assuring the truth-
fulness of the promotions could legitimate substantial control 
of the dealers' prices: 
If it is lawful to advertise a retail price [as the parties agreed it 
was], it should be lawful to take at least the minimum steps nee· 
essary to make that advertising beneficial. It would be pretty em-
barrassing for a manufacturer who had advertised a special retail 
price to be bombarded by complaints from consumers that dealers 
were refusing to sell them at that price. Such refusals would make 
the advertising misleading and might even expose the manufac-
turer to legal sanctions under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
or counterpart state regulations. So if retail price advertising by 
manufacturers is to be feasible the manufacturer must be allowed 
to take reasonable measures to make sure the advertised price is 
not exceeded. These measures include trying to persuade dealers 
to adhere to the advertised price and checking around to make 
sure they are adhering. These are the respects in which Morton is 
alleged to have gone beyond the simple announcement of policy 
and refusal to deal with noncompliers that would be perrnissible 
even if it were trying to get its dealers to adhere to its suggested 
retail prices across the board. They are the minimum steps that 
Morton had to take if its advertised price was to have any value 
at all, and they are therefore lawful. 29 
Thus, a manufacturer has the right to involve itself sub-
stantially in dealer pricing during an advertised promotion 
where the manufacturer's involvement is reasonably nec-
essary to make the price promotion effective. Unlike the 
result in Consortium, the result in Walters is plausible, pre-
cisely because it is based on a realistic view of the manu-
facturer's interest in the retail stage of distribution. 
III. The Propriety of Cooperation in 
the Distribution Process 
Albrecht, like the cases just discussed, is susceptible to a 
manufacturer's-interest analysis. In the view of the Albrecht 
Court~ manufacturers are merely sellers and dealers are 
merely buyers, their relationship not differing essentially 
from that of a retailer and its custom.ers. ·under Albrecht, a 
manufacturer-seller has no more legitimate interest in what 
its buyer-dealer does with goods he buys for resale than a 
Summer 1988 • Franchise Law Journal 17 
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retailer has ·in what a consumer does with goods he buys for 
use. As the Supreme Court explained in a contemporaneous 
opinion, u[i]f the manufacturer parts with dominion over 
his product ... he may not reserve control over its des-
tiny. HJo Such a view of the distribution process leads inex-
orably to the further view that manufacturers and dealers 
naturally tend to become adversaries, because of manufac-
turers' constant, and presumptively unjustified, attempts to 
involve themselves in dealers' decisions as to marketing and 
price. In the Albrecht view, manufacturers are meddlers. 
But the reasoning in Albrecht simply begs the question. The 
Court assumes that, upon sale to a dealer, a manufacturer 
uparts with dominion over his product." In particular the 
Court presumes that, upon sale to a dealer, the manufacturer 
Distribution is a process in which the 
dealer1 as well as the manufacturer, might 
reasonably wish, and even request, that 
the manufacturer become involved at the 
retail stage. 
abdicates all interest in the sale of the good to consumers. 
But the world is not as Albrecht presumes. Distribution is a 
process in which the dealer, as well as the manufacturer, might 
reasonably wish, and even request, that the manufacturer 
become involved at the retail stage. Cooperation may be 
helpful.. if not essential, for the orderly, efficient, and 
profitable marketing of the goods and services. For exam pi~. 
in order to stimulate or improve a retailer .. s perforn1ance, a 
manufacturer, with the agreement of a retailer, might provide 
• 
training of retail personnel, cooperative advertising programs, 
in-store promotions, incentive programs for sales personnel, 
seHing aids, and representatives who assist and advise. 31 
Contrary to the view of Albrecht, it is cooperation, rather 
than conflict, that is the not rn in the distribution process. 
The Supreme Court, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Ser-
l'ice Corp.,·n has recognized the importance of manufactur-
er-dealer cooperation, recognized that it is norrnal, and 
recognized that such cooperation must be accounted for in 
the antitrust analysis of vertical restraints. As the Court ex-
plained, in upholding the propriety of cooperation through 
exchanges of inforrnation: 
[ D]istributors are an imponant source of information for man-
ufacturers. In order to assure an efficient distribution system. 
manufacturers and distributors constantly must coordinate their 
activities to assure that their product will reach the consumer 
persuasively and efficiently. ·':\ 
The Court then held that antitrust rules should be carefully 
drawn so as not to inhibit this proper and important form 
18 Franchise Law Journal • Summer 1988 
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of cooperation.34 But if manufacturer-dealer cooperation is 
natural, and if legitimate manufacturer-dealer cooperation 
should not be prohibited, or even inhibited, by the Sherman 
Act, the basis for the sweeping prohibition of Albrecht is 
undermined. For as lower court decisions have come to rec-
ognize, resale price ceilings may well reflect legitimate co-
ordination of activities between a manufacturer and its 
dealer. 
The best example of this is promotional price advertising. 
It is widely recognized that price advertising, especially in 
connection with promotions, is a legitimate area of coop-
eration between a manufacturer and its dealers. Coopera-
tive advenising of price by a group of franchisees has long 
been recognized as a practice subject to the rule of reason. 35 
Furtherntore, courts have held that a manufacturer's fund-
ing of promotional discounts to dealers is also subject to the 
rule of reason. 36 As Walters recognized, such legitimate co-
operation may have the necessary effect of temporarily lim-
iting a dealer's pricing discretion. But the temporary restric-
tion is not illegitimate meddling by the manufacturer; it is 
an integral part of the manufacturer's and dealers' legiti-
mate coordination of promotional activity. 
Another example of legitimate coordination arises where 
a manufacturer, through superior resources, has better 
knowledge than the local dealer of how to price and market 
goods effectively. The law of resale price maintenance pro-
tects the pricing discretion of the local merchant in part (but 
not exclusively) because he is presumed to have better in-
formation about market conditions and to be able to re-
spond efficiently to changes in competitive conditions. 37 But 
where that assumption is unsound, or where the manufac~ 
turer may at least usefully contribute to the pricing decision, 
there may be greater scope for it to participate with the deal-
er in setting maximum prices.38 Greater freedom to become 
. 
involved in retail pricing has long been recognized to be the 
case in consignment relationships where manufacturers are 
privileged to dictate prices. 39 Arguably, greater freedom 
should be allowed in many franchise relationships as well. 
A third example is that of disttibution systems where on-
going, close cooperation between the manufacturer and 
dealers is required because of factors inherent in the prod-
uct or service delivered. Newspapers, for example, may re-
quire price ceilings to ensure the circulation penetration 
needed for the newspaper to be successfully marketed to 
advertisers, and thereby financially viable. 40 A nationwide 
restaurant franchisor may require price ceilings to ensure 
the maintenance of a moderate or low-price image essential 
to consumer appeal. 41 Even a proponent of the strict pro-
hibition of resale price maintenanc~ observes that 
[A) firnt, such as a fast food franchisor, which licenses a trade 
name and which may sell products to be resold under this trade 
name ... has a considerable interest in the resale activities of 
franchisees and might be given a right to participate with fran-
chisees in ;>rice making, at least to the extent of suggesting a price 
and advertising it.42 
I . • 
• 
In cases such as these, retail price ceilings may be justified 
as a prerequisite to the system9s operation and success.43 
IV. Should the Present Per Se Prohibition Be Modified? 
If one were to put aside the history of Supreme Court 
decisions on the subject of retail price ceilings and deter-
mine the standard of legality simply in light of contempo-
rary antitrust jurisprudence, then the rule of reason surely 
would apply. Albrecht's reasoning to a conclusion of per se 
illegality is unconvincing. It is true that a retail price ceil-
ing ···like any other business practice has some potential 
for anticompetitive harm. But the principal harm of retail 
price ceilings that the Supreme Court identified in Albrecht 
is the preemption of dealers' independent judgment, which 
may force them to price the affected product at a level that 
they believe is too low. Yet preemption of dealer judgment, 
as a principal potential harm, for most trade practices jus-
tifies only a rule of reason standard, 44 and for others has 
been held to justify per se condemnation only where the 
manufacturer has substantial market power and where a sig-
nificant amount of commerce is affected by the practice.4s 
lnde_ed, in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde,46 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a single transaction can-
not be the basis of a tying violation: 
If only a single purchaser were "forced'~ with respect to the pur-
chase of a tied item .. the resultant impact on competition would 
not be sufficient to warrant the concern ofantitrust law.47 
Moreover, the premises which led the Albrecht Court to 
its conclusion are unconvincing as welL Contrary to the 
Court's presupposition that a manufacturer's involvement 
in a dealer's pricing must be officious meddling, retail price 
Contrary to the Court's presupposition that 
a manufacturer's involvement in a dealer's 
pricing must be officious meddling, retail 
price ceilings may well be an expression 
of the manufacturer's legitimate interest 
in cooperating with dealers in order to fa-
cilitate distribution of the service or goods. 
. 
. .. 
ceilings may well be an expression of the manufacturer~s 
legitimate interest in cooperating with dealers in order to 
facilitate distribution of the service or good. As Monsanto 
recognized, such cooperation may be an activity to be pro-
tected rather than condemned by section l of the Sherrnan 
Act. 
Even antitrust scholars who advocate a strict prohibition 
of retail price floors agree that retail price ceilings should 
be treated more leniently. 48 Institutional inertia, however, 
may be an obstacle to a complete overruling of Albrecht. The 
Supreme Court has stated that well-established per se pro-
hibitions, in particular those relating to price restraints, 
should not be abolished •. except by Congress. 49 Yet the pro-
hibition of retail price ceilings, unlike the prohibitions of 
cartels and of retail price -floors, is arguably a recent inno-
vation. In addition, unlike those other prohibitions, it is one 
that has been almost unanimously criticized by scholars and 
one that is troublesome to the lower couns. Its status is like 
that of the prohibition of manufacturer-imposed customer 
and territorial restrictions in 1977. At that time, the Su-
preme Court overruled a decision that it had rendered only 
ten years prior, which held such restrictions to be per se 
illegal. so Overrule of Albrecht thus has some institutional 
precedent. 
But even if Albrecht is not overruled, its holding should 
be cut back. The decision rests on a faulty notion of distri-
bution, in supposing that a manufacturer never has a legit-
. imate interest in how a produc~ or service is priced for sale 
to consumers and in supposing that cooperation between a 
-manufacturer and its dealers regarding price ceilings is nev-
er legitimate. The premise is wrong in the case of price pro-
motions and wrong in the case of many franchise relation-
ships. In the cases where manufacturer involvement in retail 
pricing reflects norrnal, desirable activity to facilitate dis-
tribution, a. rule of reason standard for liab_ility should be 
applied. 
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We'd like to hear from you 
Maybe you agree with the opinions of an author of 
one of our articles .. Or maybe you disagree~ Perhaps 
you would like to express an opinion on a topic of 
interest to the franchise bar. The Editor would like to 
hear from readers of Franchise Law Journal so that a 
regular Letters to the Editor column can be published. 
Send your comments to W. M-ichael Garner, 
Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis, 330 Madison A v~ 
enue, New York, NY 10017. Every effort will be made 
to publish your letter. We do reserve the right, how-
ever, to edit for length and style. 
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